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IN THE UTAH UTAH SUPREME COURT
TAMMY BLUEMEL,
Respondent/Plaintiff,
Supreme Court Case No.20060586-SC
vs.

Court of Appeals Case No. 20050208-CA

STATE OF UTAH,
Petitioner/Defendant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals from
its decision in Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181, reh'g denied (May 25,
2006), Addendum A. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782-2(5) (West 2004).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the court of appeals apply the correct standards for reviewing allegations
of a rule 11 violation raised for the first time in a post-conviction petition?
Issue 2: Did the court of appeals err in its evaluation of the interests-of-justice
exception to the one-year statute of limitations for post-conviction petitions?
Standards of Review. On certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the court of
appeals for correctness, and the correctness of that decision "turns on whether [the court of
appeals] accurately reviewed the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of
review." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 9, 22 P.3d 1242.

OPINION BELOW
The court of appeals opinion under review is Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141,134
P.3d 181, reh 'g denied (May 25, 2006), Addendum A.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following relevant statutes and rules is reproduced in Addendum
B:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (West 2004)
Utah R. Civ. P. 65C (West 2005).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Procedural History.
On September 20, 2001, petitioner was charged with seven counts of rape, a first

degree felony, and one count of supplying alcohol to a minor. R. 61-62. On December 5,
2001, petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying alcohol to
a minor. The remaining counts were dismissed. R. 50. On March 27,2002, petitioner was
sentenced to five years to life on each count of rape, and one year for supplying alcohol to a
minor. R. 47-48.
Petitioner did not move to withdraw her pleas and did not appeal. More than two
years later, on May 3, 2004, petitioner filed a petition for relief under the Utah PostConviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 -09 (West 2004) ("PCRA"), in the
Fourth Judicial District Court in Utah County. R. 1-19.
The State moved to dismiss the petition as untimely under the PCRA's one-year
statute of limitations. R. 66-86; see Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l) (West 2004). The State
2

also argued alternatively that, even on the merits, petitioner's claims should be dismissed.
Id
The post-conviction court granted the State's motion to dismiss and petitioner timely
appealed.
On April 13,2006, without oral argument, the court of appeals reversed, holding that
the trial court had not strictly complied with rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which rendered the plea unknowing and involuntary. Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, f 16,
Addendum A. The court further determined that, because the plea was unknowing and
involuntary, petitioner met the interests of justice exception to the PCRA's statute of
limitations. See idat\ 17.
B.

Statement of Facts
Petitioner acknowledged her crimes during her change-of-plea hearing on December

5, 2001. R 57:2-6 (hearing transcript), Addendum C; Videotape of change-of-plea hearing
("Video"), R. 146; see also Statement of Defendant In Support of Guilty Plea and Certificate
of Counsel, dated December 5, 2001 ("Plea Statement"), Addendum D. During the plea
hearing, the court reviewed the factual basis for the crimes, the penalties petitioner faced and
the rights she was waiving by pleading guilty.
THE COURT: Do you understand each of your rights? You have a
right to a speedy trial, a right to a trial by jury, a right to confront and cross [-]
examine the witnesses against you. You have a right not to incriminate
yourself; you don't have to take the witness stand and testify. In fact, you
don't have to prove or disprove anything. The burden of proof is upon the
State to prove each and every element of the crimes that are alleged. Do you
understand that?

3

MS BLUEMEL: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you waive those rights?
MS. BLUEMEL: I do, your honor.
R. 57:3.
The Plea Statement included a section titled "Waiver of Constitutional Rights," which
explains all the rights the petitioner waived by pleading guilty, including the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial and the right to confront witnesses. R. 5758.
The court advised her that the first-degree felony rape charges each carried a possible
penalty of five years to life and a $10,000 fine. R. 57:3. The class A misdemeanor charge of
supplying alcohol to a minor provided a possible penalty of up to a year in jail and a $2,500
fine.
The Plea Statement provided the elements of the crime to which petitioner pled guilty.
R. 58. It also contains a factual basis for the plea:
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest)
pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or
no contest): Between October 1998 and April 1999, in Utah County, state of
Utah, defendant had sexual intercourse on three (3) separate occasions with a
person unable to give consent Victim was a 14yr. oldfoster child. Between
October 1998 and April 1999, in Utah County, State of Utah, defendant
provided alcohol to a minor.
R. 58.1

Emphasis added to delineate portions of the form that were handwritten.
4

Additionally, the prosecutor orally stated the factual basis for the record: "On or
between October and April of 1999 in Lehi, Utah, this individual had sexual intercourse with
a 14-year-old victim on at least three separate, and she also supplied alcohol to this
individual."
THE COURT: Are those facts true?
MS. BLUEMEL: Yes, your honor.
R. 57:4.
The Plea Statement contains "Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness," which
states that petitioner read the statement (or had it read to her), and that she understood its
contents. R. 55. It also states:
I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not
presently under the influence of any drug, medication, or intoxicants which
impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally
capable of understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea.
I am free of any mental disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me
from understanding what I am doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily entering my plea.
Id.
In addition, petitioner's trial counsel signed a "Certificate of Defense Attorney."
This certificate states in part that counsel discussed the plea with petitioner and that counsel
"believe[s] that. . . she folly understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent." R. 54.

5

When asked by the court if she had any questions about the written Plea Statement,
she answered: "I don't, your Honor." See R 57:3; 146 (Video at 11:17:25). In fact,
petitioner accurately and without hesitation answered the Court's questions throughout the
hearing. R. 57:3-5; 146 (Video atl 1:15:44-11:21:24). At the conclusion ofthe hearing, the
Court stated: "I find Ms. Bluemel has knowingly and voluntarily entered her pleas." R. 57:5;
146 (Video at 11:19:54). Petitioner signed the Plea Statement in open court. R. 57:4.
Petitioner filed her petition for post-conviction relief on May 3,2004—more than two
years after she was sentenced. R. 1-8. Petitioner alleged that several medications she was
taking to treat depression, panic attacks, insomnia, menstrual cramping, urinary tract
infections, ulcers, heartburn, muscle tension and migraines interfered with her ability to
knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. R. 11-13.
The State was ordered to respond and moved to dismiss the petition based on the oneyear statute of limitations in Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(l) (West 2004). R. 66-86. The
State also argued that, even on the merits, petitioner's claims should be dismissed. Petitioner
opposed the motion. R. 116-26.
In granting the motion to dismiss, the post-conviction court ruled that petitioner had
missed the one-year deadline and that the "interests of justice" exception in the postconviction remedies statute did not excuse the tardiness:
Again assuming her allegations to be true for the purpose of this motion, this
court is not convinced that the interest of justice should grant relief in this
case. The legislative intent was to require action on an alleged infirmity
within a year. In this case the Petitioner became convinced or satisfied that
her counsel was not or would not help her during the first year. She then
waited more than an additional year to begin this petition with new counsel.
6

No reasonable excuse is provided for that delay. Even if the first year is
discounted as being the result of the bad counsel and advice from her first
attorney, she still failed to act within the statutory limit to begin this action.
No reason or excuse is provided for that behavior. It is therefore the
conclusion of this court that in this case the tardy filing is not a case where the
interests of justice require a waiver of the statutory filing limit.
R. 131.
The court of appeals reversed. Bluemel v. State, 2006 UT App 141, 134 P.3d 181,
reh }g denied (May 25, 2006). The Bluemel panel held that the trial court erred by failing to
strictly follow rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, in conducting the plea colloquy
with defendant and taking the plea. Id. at f 16. "[T]he trial court failed to inform Bluemel of
her 'right to the presumption of innocence,' that the State carried the burden of proving her
guilty 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' that her 'plea is an admission of all those elements,' and
that she had the 'right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses.'" Id. (citing Utah
R.Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A)). The court further held that because a rule 11 violation
"infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused," petitioner's untimeliness in filing her
petition for post-conviction was excused by the "interests ofjustice" exception of the Utah
Post-Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA). Id. at 117.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: The court of appeals' decision in Bluemel should be reversed because it
contradicts this Court's established precedent in three respects. First, it incorrectly holds that
a technical rule 11 violation, without more, is sufficient to demonstrate that a plea is not
knowing or voluntary and warrants setting the plea aside in a collateral action. This Court
has stated unequivocally that a technical rule 11 violation alone does not render a guilty plea
7

unknowing or involuntary on collateral review. Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988,992 (Utah
1993). Second, Bluemel states that harm may be presumed in collateral proceedings
whenever rule 11 is violated. This holding is unsupported in Utah law and conflicts with
United States Supreme Court precedent. Third, Bluemel incorrectly implies that in assessing
whether a plea is knowing and voluntary, a post-conviction court is limited to a review of the
plea colloquy and the plea affidavit. On the contrary, this Court has stated that in addition to
the plea colloquy and plea statement, an appellate court may also base its findings on the
"'contents of other documents such as the information, presentence reports, [and] exhibits.9"
State v. Corwell, 2005 UT 28, f 12,114 P.3d 569 (quoting State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 12,
22 P.3d 1242). The district court may also "consider other factors in the record, including the
defendant's "'personal trial experience.'" Id. (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, f 13).
Point II: A proper analysis of the "interests of justice" exception to the PCRA's
statute of limitations demonstrates that the petition here is time-barred. First, petitioner
waited more than one year to file her petition and has offered no explanation for her
tardiness. Second, on the merits, petitioner has not met her burden to demonstrate that her
claims are potentially meritorious.

8

ARGUMENT
I.

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS5 DECISION TO REVERSE
ON POST-CONVICTION BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ALLEGEDLY DID NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 11
CONFLICTS WITH CLEARLY ESTABLISHED UTAH
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT.

Because Bluemel conflicts with (1) the express language of the PCRA, (2) precedent
from this Court and, (3) from federal and state jurisdictions interpreting similar rule 11
language— and {A) the decisions of other court of appeals panels—this Court should vacate
the court of appeals' decision and affirm the post-conviction court.
A.

Under Established Precedent from This Court and the Court of
Appeals, a Rule 11 Violation is Insufficient to Warrant PostConviction Relief.

Bluemel holds that an otherwise knowing and voluntary plea is vitiated by failure to
strictly comply with rule 11 and must be set aside under the Utah Post-Conviction Remedies
Act: "[B]ecause noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the constitutional rights of the
accused.. .we conclude that noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the interests-ofjustice exception under the PCRA

" Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^f 17 (emphasis added;

citation omitted). Thus, Bluemel equates a rule 11 violation with a constitutional defect in
the plea.
This holding conflicts with both the PCRA and this Court's precedent.2 The PCRA
gives the district court jurisdiction to set aside a conviction or sentence imposed in violation

2

This Court may also reverse because the trial court's alleged failure to strictly
comply with rule 11 in the taking of the plea was not raised below or briefed on appeal. State
9

of the United States or Utah constitutions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (West
2004). Because petitioner was sentenced in 2001, the statute then in effect stated that she
could withdraw her plea "only upon good cause shown and with leave of the court." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (2001).3 This Court has stated that "good cause" included the
trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44,111, 1
P.3d 1108. This Court has also held, however, that strict compliance with rule 11 creates a
presumption that the plea was voluntarily entered. State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, f 9, 26
P.3d 203 (citing Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, ^ 11). But the "good cause" standard applies only on
direct appeal when the defendant has timely moved to withdraw her plea. Indeed, this Court
has unequivocally stated that rule 11 violations alone are insufficient to create the
constitutional violations necessary to justify post-conviction relief: "To obtain a writ of
habeas corpus, a petitioner must show more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of
rule 11; he or she must show that the guilty plea was in fact not knowing and voluntary."
Salazar v. Warden, 852 P.2d 988, 992 (Utah 1993) (emphasis added).
"This is because the core constitutional protection at issue here is the

v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, f 41, — P.3d — . Rather, petitioner alleged that several
medications she was taking to treat depression, panic attacks, insomnia, menstrual cramping,
urinary tract infections, ulcers, heartburn, muscle tension and migraines interfered with her
ability to knowingly and voluntarily enter a guilty plea. R. 11-13. If the court of appeals had
either held oral argument or requested supplemental briefing, it is likely that this error would
have been avoided. See id. at ^f 24.
3
This statute was amended in 2003 to state that a plea may withdrawn "only upon
leave of the court and a showing that it was not knowingly and voluntarily made" Utah Code
Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a) (West 2004) (emphasis added). This amendment, thus, replaced the
previous "good cause" standard with the constitutional standard.
10

requirement that a guilty plea must be truly voluntary. Rule 11 is a device for
protecting the right but the scope of Rule [11] does not equal the more limited
scope of the constitutional right Thus, a guilty plea is constitutionally infirm,
as opposed to only violative of Rule 11, when the plea is not knowing and
intelligent."
Id. at 991 (quoting Haase v. United States, 800 F.2d 123,126-27 (7th Cir.1986)) (emphasis
added by this Court); see Warner v. Morris 709 P.2d 309,310 (Utah 1985) (although rule 11
requirement that defendant be advised of right against self-incrimination was not followed,
petitioner entered guilty plea "with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights he was waiving, including his right against self-incrimination."); see also
State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381,1f 21 n. 9, 81 P.3d 775 (to succeed in collateral attack
on the validity of a guilty plea used to enhance subsequent crimes, defendant must show
more than a rule 11 violation).4
Salazar accords with numerous state and federal cases holding that a rule 11 violation
is insufficient to support a claim of a constitutional violation in post-conviction proceedings.
See, e.g., United States v. Timmreck, 441 U.S. 780, 783-84 (1979) (because petitioner
claimed only a technical violation of federal rule 11 rather than constitutional prejudice, the
court would not grant habeas relief; rule 11 does not set forth constitutional requirements);
United States v. Grewal, 825 F.2d 220.222 (9th Cir. 1987) (federal habeas petitioner claiming
federal rule 11 violation "must establish that the violation amounted to a jurisdictional or

The State recognizes that case law often uses "voluntary" and "knowing"
interchangeably. However, "voluntariness" technically means a lack of police coercion. Cf
Connelly v. Colorado, 479 U.S. 157,167 (1986) (a confession is involuntary only if results
from "coercive police activity").
11

constitutional error or that the violation resulted in a complete miscarriage ofjustice or in a
proceeding inconsistent with the demands of fair procedure"); People v. Holvey, 308 N.E.2d
622, 623 (111. App. 1974) ("A violation of a statute or of rules of procedure which do not
constitute constitutional rights may not be considered" on post-conviction.); Powers v. State,
942 S.W.2d 551, 555 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1996) (failure to state factual basis for guilty plea, as
required by rule 11, is not a constitutional violation on post-conviction).
Before Bluemel, the court of appeals' opinions were also consistent with Salazar and
the foregoing federal authority. For example, in Moench v. State, the court of appeals held
that "in post-conviction relief cases, 'a failure to comply with Utah's rule 11 in taking a
guilty plea does not in itself amount to a violation of a defendant's rights under either the
Utah or the United States Constitution.'" 2004 UT App 57, % 17, 88 P.3d 353 (quoting
Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992); see also State v. Lehi, 2003 UT App 212, ^ 9, n. 3, 73 P.3d 985
(observing that "collateral attack" cases, unlike cases involving direct appeal, require a
constitutional violation, "which is 'more than a violation of the prophylactic provisions of
rule 11'") (citing Salazar, 852 P.2d at 991).
The Bluemel panel never addresses Salazar or Moench, or in any way attempts to
explain why it diverges from longstanding precedent in holding that a rule 11 violation is not
sufficient to establish a constitutional violation on post-conviction. Indeed, the only cases
cited in Bluemel to support its dramatic departure from precedent are criminal cases
involving claimed rule 11 violations on direct appeal Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141,^10-15
(citing, e.g. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, U 11,22 P.3d 1242; State v. Maguire, 830 P.2d 216,
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217 (Utah 1991); State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, 22, 69 P.3d 838; State v. Stilling, 856
P.2d 666,671 (Utah A^.1991>)\ State v. Smith, U2V2& 470,477 (Utah App. 1991)). These
cases have no direct relevance here because none of them discuss or endorse requiring strict
compliance with rule 11 when evaluating a guilty plea on post-conviction.
The closest Bluemel comes to explaining its reasoning is a passing reference to State
v. Stilling, a court of appeals case affirming a defendant's Alford plea to charges of robbery.
Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141,^17. Bluemel cites Stilling as support for the proposition that
"noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the constitutional rights of the accused." Id. But
Stilling, does not support the proposition that strict rule 11 compliance is co-extensive with a
constitutional violation. Stilling "filed a pro-se petition for post-conviction relief to set aside
his guilty pleas." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah App. 1993). However, because
the law in effect at that time set no time limit for filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea,
the trial court and the court of appeals addressed Stilling's claims as a motion to withdraw
his plea filed in the criminal case. Id. at 668 n.l;see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1988)
("A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of court"). Thus, procedurally, Stillling was essentially a direct appeal from the denial
of his motion to withdraw his plea rather than a collateral attack on his plea.
More important, Stilling's general pronouncements on the importance of procedural
rules in protecting constitutional rights during guilty pleas do not support the proposition
that rule 11 violations equal constitutional violations. For instance, Stilling states that the
procedure for accepting guilty pleas has "evolved through court decisions construing both

13

procedural rules and constitutionally guaranteed due process" and that reviewing courts
"often overlap the doctrines from these two sources." Id. at 670-71. If these excerpts are
taken to mean that procedural rules, such as rule 115 are designed to safeguard substantive
constitutional rights, they are uncontroversial because "[t]he purpose of rule 11 is to ensure
that a defendant knows of his or her rights and thereby understands the consequences of a
decision to plead guilty." State v. Martinez, 2001 UT 12, % 9, 26 P.3d 203; see also State v.
Visser, 2000 UT 88, Tf 11,22 P.3d 1242 ("[T]he substantive goal of rule 11 is to ensure that
defendants know of their rights and thereby understand the basic consequences of their
decision to plead guilty"). But if Stilling is interpreted to mean, as Bluemel seems to hold,
that any technical "noncompliance" with the prophylactic rule 11 requirements "infringes on
the constitutional rights of the accused," Bluemel, 2006 UT App. 141, ^ 17, such an
interpretation cannot be squared with peculiar legal and factual limitations of Stilling or with
the caselaw holding that a rule 11 violation, without more, does not demonstrate a
constitutional defect in the plea, a necessary predicate for post-conviction relief. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a) (PCRA gives district court jurisdiction to set aside conviction
or sentence imposed in violation of the United States or Utah constitutions); Salazar, 852
P.2d 988 at 991 ("Rule [11] does not equal the more limited scope of the constitutional
right").
B.

Bluemel Incorrectly Held that Prejudice Is Presumed from a Rule
11 Violation.

Bluemel contradicts Utah precedent because it states that harm may be presumed
whenever rule 11 is violated: "'It is well established under Utah law that we will presume
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harm . . . when a trial court fails to inform a defendant of his constitutional rights under rule
11.'" Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141 at \ 10 (citing State v. Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 22, 69
P.3d 838) (omission in original) (citation and quotations omitted). This holding is also
inconsistent with this Court's precedent and contradicted by United States Supreme Court
caselaw.
The court of appeals relies State v. Mora. Id. However, the Mora holding is premised
on court of appeals' cases that have been subsequently overturned. See Mora, 2003 UT App
117, f 22 (citing State v. Dean, 2002 UT App 323, % 12,57 P.3d 1106, rev 'd, 2004 UT 63, ^
23,95 P.3d 276; State v. Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, \ 9,47 P.3d 101, rev 'd, 2004 UT 46, K 5,
94 P.3d 268). In Dean and Hittle, the court of appeals determined that harm may be
presumed under a plain error analysis where the trial court violates rule 11 by not informing
the defendant of his right to a "speedy" trial by an "impartial" jury. Dean, 2002 UT App
323,112; Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, \ 9.5 This Court reversed, holding that the defendants,
who had not preserved their claim in their motions to withdraw, were required to show "plain
error" in the trial court's failure to strictly comply with rule 11. Thus, the defendants in that
case were required to show prejudice, i.e., that "but for the court's omission of the words
'speedy' and 'impartial' he would not have pled guilty and would have gone to trial." Dean,
2004 UT 63, TJ23. In other words, on direct appeal, in the plain error context, a defendant is

5

Dean and Hittle were issued on the same day and have "nearly identical" facts.
Hittle, 2002 UT App 134, ^ 5. Thus, in Hittle, this Court simply incorporated the Dean
analysis by reference. Id.
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"required to show that any error by the court actually 'affected the outcome of the plea
process."5 Id. (citation omitted). If a defendant on direct appeal in a plain error context, such
as Dean, is required to show prejudice, a post-conviction petitioner should certainty have to
make a similar showing; otherwise, the post-conviction standard would be lower.
United States Supreme Court precedent similarly holds that prejudice cannot be
presumed from a violation the rules of criminal procedure. For example, in United States v.
Timmreck, the Supreme Court held that a defendant was not entitled to habeas relief, even
though the District Court had not informed him that he was subject to a mandatory special
parole term, as required by rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 441 U.S.
780, 785 (1979). The Supreme Court observed that Timmereck had not claimed that he
would not have pleaded guilty if he had known of the special parole term. Id, at 784. Thus,
because Timmereck claimed only a "technical violation" of the rule, he had failed to allege
prejudice and was not entitled to habeas relief. Id.
Similarly, in Peguero v. United States, a defendant challenged the validity of his
guilty plea because the trial court had not advised him of his right to appeal his sentence.
526 U.S. 23,24 (1999). At the time, the federal rules of criminal procedure provided that a
trial court did not have a duty "to advise the defendant of any right of appeal after sentence is
imposed following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, except that the court shall advise the
defendant of any right to appeal the sentence." Id. at 26 {see Fed. R. Crim. P 32(a)(2)). The
Supreme Court agreed that the trial court had erred, but held that "a court's failure to give a
defendant advice required by the Federal Rules is a sufficient basis for collateral relief only

16

when the defendant is prejudiced by the court's error," Id. at 27 (emphasis added). The
court held that Peguero had not shown prejudice from the trial court's error because he
already knew of his right to appeal. Id. at 24-28.
The rationale of Timmreck and Peguero is equally persuasive here. The Bluemel
panel presumed prejudice from the trial court's alleged failure under rule 11 to inform
petitioner of her "'right to the presumption of innocence,' that the State carried the burden of
proving her guilty 'beyond a reasonable doubt,' that her 'plea is an admission of all those
elements,' and that she had the 'right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses.'"
Bluemel 2006 UT App 141, \ 16 (citing Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A)). These
omissions, however, are mere "technical violations" of rule 11 because petitioner never
claimed she would not have pleaded guilty if she had been apprised of those rights. In fact,
she never mentioned these alleged oversights. In her petition, she claimed that she was
under the influence of prescription medications and "was not competent to enter a knowing
and voluntary plea . . ." R. 119. She never claimed she was entitled to relief based no a
technical rule 11 violation and this Court may reverse on that basis alone. State v. Robison,
2006 UT 65, •fl 41, — P.3d — . In any event, if a showing of prejudice is required on direct
appeal when a defendant fails to properly preserve a rule 11 violation in his motion to
withdraw his plea, it should certainly be require on post-conviction where a technical rule
violation is not enough by itself to warrant relief. As stated, the PCRA requires a showing of
a constitutional violation—/. £., the plea was entered unknowingly or involuntarily. Thus, to
prevail on post-conviction based on a rule 11 violation the petitioner must at minimum show
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that the alleged rule 11 violation was such that it rendered the plea unknowing and
involuntary or that, but for the court's omission, she would not have pleaded guilty and
would have gone to trial.
C.

Bluemel Incorrectly Implies that the Court of Appeals was Limited
to the Examining Plea Colloquy and Plea Affidavit in Determining
Whether Petitioner's Plea is Knowing and Voluntary; In Fact, the
Court of Appeals Should Have Reviewed the Entire Trial Court
Record.

Bluemel implies that in assessing whether a plea is knowing and voluntary, a postconviction court is limited to reviewing the plea colloquy and the plea affidavit. See
Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, f 13 ('"It is critical . . . that strict [r]ule 11 compliance be
demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty . . . plea is entered. Therefore, if [a plea
statement] is used to aid [rjule 11 compliance, it must be addressed during the plea
hearing."5) (quoting Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 19).
On the contrary, this Court had held that a trial court may consider Ihe record as a
whole to determine whether a defendant understands the rights he or she is waiving:
[Rjule 11 itself contemplates that the district court may base its findings on
either the "questioning of the defendant on the record or, if used,v' a plea
affidavit, "after the court has established that the defendant has read,
understood, and acknowledged the contents of the statement." Utah R.Crim.
P. 11(e). Additionally, we have held that the district court may also base its
required findings on the "contents of other documents such as the information,
presentence reports, [and] exhibits.". . . Moreover, the district court may
consider other factors in the record, including the defendant's "personal trial
experience."
State v. Cornell, 2005 UT 28, % 12,114 P.3d 569 (quoting Visser, 2000 UT 88, \ 12,13); see
also Salazar, 852 P.2d at 992 (trial court "is not limited to the record of the plea hearing but
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may look at the surrounding facts and circumstances, including the information the petitioner
received from his or her attorneys before entering the plea"). Additionally, although the
issue of proper incorporation of the plea statement into the record has been held to be a
requirement on direct appeal under rule 11, Mora, 2003 UT App 117, f 20, it is not a
requirement under the PCRA because the issue is whether the plea was entered in violation
of the constitution. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-104(l)(a); Salazar, 852 P.2d 988 at 991.
Thus, to the extent that the Bluemel panel holds that an appellate court reviewing a
collateral attack on a guilty plea is limited to reviewing the plea colloquy and the plea
affidavit, it is incorrect.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVERSING THE
POST-CONVICTION COURT BECAUSE THE PETITION WAS
UNTIMELY AND ITS LATENESS SHOULD NOT BE EXCUSED
IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE.

The petition was clearly untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations.
Nonetheless, the court of appeals excused petitioner's tardiness under the catch-all "interests
of justice" exception to the statute of limitations. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(3).
"[Noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls within the interests-of-justice exception under
the PCRA . . ." Bluemel 2006 UT App 141 at f 17.
Petitioner claims are untimely and unmeritorious. To excuse a tardy petition in the
"interests of justice," a petitioner must (1) explain the reasons the petition was late and (2)
present evidence and legal authority demonstrating that the petition presents a potentially
meritorious claim. Adams v. State, 2005 UT 62, \ 16,123 P.3d 400. "The petitioner bears
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the burden of pointing to sufficient factual evidence or legal authority to support a
conclusion of meritoriousness." Id. at f 20. Thus, petitioner's claims are time-barred, first,
because she has offered no explanation for her late filing and, second, because she has not
met her burden to demonstrate that her claim that that her plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily entered is potentially meritorious.
A.

The Petition Is More A Year Late and Petitioner Has Provided No
Explanation or Justification for Her Tardiness.

The PCRA requires a post-conviction petition to be filed within one year of the
accrual of a cause of action. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107(1) (West 2004). Because
petitioner did not appeal, her cause of action for post-conviction relief accrued on April 26,
2002—"the last day for filing an appeal from the entry of the final judgment of conviction,..
." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a-107(2)(a) (West 2004). Under the statute, she had until April 26,
2003, to file her petition. Because she did not file her petition until May 3,2004, it was more
than a year too late.
Petitioner has no excuse for her tardiness. As the post-conviction court stated:
In this case the Petitioner became convinced or satisfied that her counsel was
not [helping] or would not help her during the first year. She then waited
more than an additional year to begin this petition with new counsel. No
reasonable excuse is provided for that delay. Even if the first year is
discounted as being the result of the bad counsel and advice from her first
attorney, she still failed to act within the statutory limit to begin this action.
No reason or excuse is provided for that behavior.
R. 131. Accordingly, the post-conviction court correctly dismissed the petition as time
barred.
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B.

Petitioner Does Not Meet the "Interests Of Justice" Exception
Because She Has Not Met Her Burden to Demonstrate that Her
Claim that Her Plea Was Not Knowingly and Voluntarily Entered
Is Potentially Meritorious.

The Bluemel panel of the court of appeals held that petitioner met the PCRA's
"interests ofjustice" exception to the one-year statute of limitations because her guilty plea
did not comport with rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 2006 UT App 141, ^f
17. Under the Bluemel panel's rationale, petitioner presented the potentially meritorious
claim that the trial court violated rule 11 by not informing her of the "'right to the
presumption of innocence,' that the State carried the burden of proving her guilty 'beyond a
reasonable doubt,' that her 'plea is an admission of all those elements,' and that she had the
'right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses.'" Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, | 16
(citing Utah R.Crim. P. 11(e)(3), (4)(A)).
To determine whether an untimely petition presents potentially meritorious claims, the
court must determine whether the petitioner has met "the burden of pointing to sufficient
factual evidence or legal authority to support a conclusion of meritoriousness.^dams, 2005
UT 62, \ 20. The Bluemel panel, as discussed in section I, erroneously determined the merits
of petitioner's claim by assuming that she was entitled to relief based solely on a technical
rule 11 violation. As explained, a proper assessment of the meritoriousness of petitioner's
claim should have been based on the more narrow constitutional standard, i.e.: Whether
petitioner affirmatively demonstrated that her guilty plea was in fact not knowing and
voluntary. Salazar v. Warden, Utah State Prison, 852 P.2d 988 (Utah 1993).
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Because the court of appeals applied the wrong standard in deciding whether
petitioner met the "interests of justice" exception, this Court should reverse for that reason
alone. But if this Court, nonetheless, decides to consider whether petitioner meets the
"interests of justice" exception, it should find that petitioner has not met her burden to
demonstrate the potential meritoriousness of the claim that her plea was not knowing and
voluntary.
A plea is in fact knowing and voluntary if there is a factual basis for the plea and the
petitioner understands and waives her privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury
trial and the right to confront witnesses. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969);
accord Blaylock v. Lockhart, 898 F.2d 1367, 1371 (8th Cir. 1990) (guilty plea waives
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, right to jury trial and right to confront
accusers); Siegel v. State of New York, 691 F.2d 620, 626 (2nd Cir. 1982) (to ensure plea is
knowing and voluntary under Boykin, "the thrust of the trial court's inquiry should be
directed toward the defendant's waiver of his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to
a jury trial, and his right to confront witnesses"); United States v. Laviguer, 801 F. Supp.
382, 384 (D. Ore. 1992) (defendant's written plea statement waived "Boykin rights" to jury
trial, right to confront witnesses, and privilege against compulsory self-incrimination);
Spencer v. State, 634 N.E.2d 500, 502 (Ind. App. 1993) ("In all cases, of course, to satisfy
Boykin the record must establish that at the time of his plea the defendant knew or was
advised that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and his right against self-incrimination"); State ex rel Jackson v. Henderson, 255
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So. 2d 85,90 (1971) (to enter knowing and voluntary guilty plea, defendant must expressly
or impliedly waive at least three federal constitutional rights—the privilege against selfincrimination and the rights to confront witnesses and to jury trial); People v. Fiumefreddo,
626 N.E.2d 646, 674 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1993) (a petitioner's plea is knowing and voluntary if
there is a factual basis for the plea and "an affirmative showing on the record that the
defendant waived her constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and her rights to a
jury trial and to be confronted by witnesses).
Under the Boykin standard, petitioner's plea was knowing and voluntary. The plea
colloquy demonstrates that the trial court orally explained all Of the Boykin rights during the
hearing:
THE COURT: Do you understand each of your rights? You have a
right to a speedy trial, a right to a trial by jury, a right to confront and cross[-]
examine the witnesses against you. You have a right not to incriminate
yourself; you don't have to take the witness stand and testify. In fact, you
don't have to prove or disprove anything. The burden of proof is upon the
State to prove each and every element of the crimes that are alleged. Do you
understand that?
MS BLUEMEL: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you waive those rights?
MS. BLUEMEL: I do, your honor.
R. 57:3.
Petitioner was also orally advised of the factual basis for her plea:
PROSECUTOR: On or between October and April of 1999 in Lehi, Utah,
this individual had sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old victim on at least
three separate, and she also supplied alcohol to this individual.
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THE COURT: Are those facts true?
MS. BLUEMEL: Yes, your honor.
R. 57:4.6
The written Plea Statement explained her rights in more detail "indicated that she had
read and understood the plea statement, that she was 'not under the influence of any drugs,
medication, or intoxicants,' and that she knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed]'
her pleas." Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^f 6; see R. 55.

In the Plea Statement, she

acknowledged the waiver of basic constitutional rights, such as the privilege against selfincrimination and the rights to a jury trial, to the presumption of innocence, to confront
witnesses, and to have the charges proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Id.; R. 57-58.
And while the Bluemel panel, in applying a more comprehensive rule 11 analysis,
faulted the trial court for not asking the petitioner specifically whether she had "read,
understood and acknowledged" the Plea Statement, Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^f 15, the

6

The factual basis was also stated in the Plea Statement:

These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty (or no contest) pleas and
prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest):
Between October 1998 and April 1999, in Utah County, state of Utah, defendant had
sexual intercourse on three (3) separate occasions with a person unable to give
consent. Victim was a 14 yr. old foster child. Between October 1998 and April 1999,
in Utah County, State of Utah, defendant provided alcohol to a minor.
R. 58 (italics indicate handwritten portion).
7

Petitioner's claim in her petition and before the court of appeals was that her plea
was not knowing and voluntary because she was impaired by prescription medications. R.
119; Bluemel, 2006 UT App 141, ^ 9, n.2. The Bluemel panel did not reach this issue because
it decided the case based on the alleged rule 11 violation.
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trial record as a whole shows petitioner understood the plea and the fundamental
constitutional rights she was waiving. She also signed the "Certification of Voluntariness,"
in which she affirms that:
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as my own. I know that
I am free to change or delete anything contained in this statement, but I do not
wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
R. 54-55. In addition, petitioner's trial counsel signed a "Certificate of Defense Attorney,"
which states in part that counsel discussed the plea with petitioner and that counsel
"believe[s] that. . . she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent." R. 54. If petitioner had not read or did not understand the Plea
Statement, she could have and should have informed the court or her attorney. Instead, when
trial court specifically asked if she had any questions, petitioner answered, "I don't, your
Honor." See R. 57:3; 146 (Video at 11:17:25). Indeed, during the plea hearing, petitioner
accurately and without hesitation answered the Court's questions, never once indicating any
confusion, disagreement or unfamiliarity with the contents of the Plea Statement. R. 57:3-5;
146 (Video atll:15:44 - 11:21:24). The Court stated: "I find Ms. Bluemel has knowingly
and voluntarily entered her pleas." R. 57:5; 146 (Video at 11:19:54).
The trial court's finding was correct and petitioner has not met her burden to prove
otherwise. The record demonstrates that petitioner's plea was entered knowingly and
voluntarily. Accordingly, this Court should reverse the court of appeals decision.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should issue a writ of certiorari to the court of
appeals and reverse the Bluemelpanel's erroneous conclusions concerning the standard for
assessing a guilty plea on post-conviction and the "interests of justice" exception to the
PCRA.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of November, 2006.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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P.J.,

McHUGH

and

OPINION
BENCH, Presiding Judge:
**1 Tammy Bluemel appeals the dismissal
of her petition for post-conviction relief.
The trial court concluded that the petition
was untimely filed and did not constitute an
interests-of-justice exception under the PostConviction Remedies Act (PCRA). See
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107 (Supp.2005).
We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
**2 Between October 1998 and April
1999, Bluemel allegedly engaged in sexual
intercourse with her fourteen-year-old foster
son on several occasions and, in one
instance, gave him alcohol. Bluemel was
charged with seven counts of rape, all first
© 2006 Thomson/West. No
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degree felonies, see Utah Code Ann. § 765-402 (2003), and one count of supplying
alcohol to a minor, a class A misdemeanor,
see Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-203 (2003).
**3 With the assistance of her trial counsel,
Bluemel negotiated a plea agreement, which
was reduced to writing as a plea statement.
The plea statement indicated that Bluemel
agreed to plead guilty to three counts of rape
and one count of supplying alcohol to a
minor, while the State agreed to dismiss the
other four counts of rape.
The plea
statement referenced the consequences of
entering a guilty plea and discussed basic
constitutional rights, such as the right to a
jury trial, the right to presumption of
innocence, and the State's burden of proof.
The plea statement also declared that
Bluemel waived these constitutional rights
and that she voluntarily entered her pleas.
Further, the plea statement indicated that
Bluemel read and understood the plea
statement, that she *184 was "not under the
influence of any drugs, medication, or
intoxicants," and that she "knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily enter[ed]" her
pleas.
**4 During her arraignment, the trial court
[FN1] informed Bluemel that "[b]efore I can
accept your pleas, you have certain
[constitutional [rjights that you need to
waive. They are talked about in that
statement in advance of plea. Do you have
any questions about the statement?"
Bluemel indicated that she did not have any
questions about the plea statement. The trial
court went on to ask Bluemel if she
understood her constitutional rights and that
she would be waiving them.
Bluemel
responded affirmatively. The trial court
then informed Bluemel "that if you wish to
withdraw these pleas you need to make a
motion in writing to do that within [thirty]
i to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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days of sentencing" and that the court
"would not automatically grant that motion."
Bluemel acknowledged that she understood.
The trial court then stated, "[s]o if you do
intend to plea, then let's have you sign the
[plea] statement." Bluemel, her attorney, the
prosecutor, and the trial judge all signed the
plea statement. Bluemel then verbally
entered on the record her guilty pleas to
three counts of rape and one count of
supplying alcohol to a minor. The trial court
accepted the pleas and found that "Bluemel
ha[d] knowingly and voluntarily entered her
pleas."
FN1. Judge Guy R. Burningham,
who has since retired, presided over
BluemeFs arraignment in 2001.
Later, in 2005, Judge James R.
Taylor presided over and dismissed
BluemeFs
petition
for
postconviction relief. For ease of
reference, we refer to both judges as
"the trial court."
**5 On March 27, 2002, Bluemel was
sentenced to three indeterminate terms of
not less than five years to life and one
indeterminate term not to exceed one year,
all of which would run concurrently.
Bluemel was immediately taken into
custody and remains incarcerated.
**6 Immediately following her sentencing,
Bluemel allegedly informed her trial counsel
that she wanted to appeal. Her trial counsel
allegedly advised Bluemel that he would
handle her appeal and informed her that she
had one year to file her appeal. During her
first year in prison, her trial counsel
allegedly visited her three times and
continually informed her that he was still
working on her appeal.
Bluemel later
attempted to contact her trial counsel
concerning the status of her appeal, but he
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refused to respond to her communications.
After one year, Bluemel sought other legal
counsel and hired her current counsel in
October 2003. After meeting with Bluemel
and reviewing the matter, her current
counsel filed the petition on May 3, 2004,
over two years after her sentencing date.
The State moved for dismissal of the
petition because it was untimely and did not
qualify
under the
interests-of-justice
exception.
The trial court dismissed
Bluemel's petition and now she appeals the
dismissal.
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
[I] **7 Bluemel argues that the trial court
erred in dismissing her petition for postconviction relief as untimely because her
circumstances come within the interests-ofjustice exception under the PCRA. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. Bluemel asserts
that she did not enter knowing and voluntary
pleas and received ineffective assistance of
counsel, either of which warrants postconviction relief. Dismissal of a petition for
post-conviction relief is reviewed " 'for
correctness without deference to the [trial]
court's conclusions of law.' " Gardner v.
Galetka, 2004 UT 42,1f 7, 94 P.3d 263
(quoting Rudolph v. Galetka, 2002 UT 7,^[
4. 43 P.3d 467).
ANALYSIS
**8 "[T]he legislature enacted the PCRA to
f
establish[ ] a substantive legal remedy for
any person who challenges a conviction or
sentence for a criminal offense.' " Id. at f 9
(second alteration in original) (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 78-35a-102(l) (2002)). Under
the PCRA, a person may file a petition for
post-conviction relief within one year after
"the last day for filing an appeal from the
entry of the final judgment of conviction, if
no appeal is taken." Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-107(2)(a). However, an untimely filing
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78-35a-107f3).

,: _£

•• -y Diuemel argues that her circumstances
in this matter fit within the PCRAfs
interests-of-justice exception, and that her
petition should not have been dismissed.
Bluemel claims the exception should be
recognized here because (1) she did not
enter knowing and voluntary pleas and (2)
she received ineffective assistance of
counsel throughout the course of the trial
court proceedings. In support; of her claim
that she did not enter knowing and voluntary
pleas, Bluemel argues that the trial court
failed to strictly comply with rule 1.1 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Utah
R.Crim.P. 1.LITN21 ..

!
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i I 11
protect a defendant's due process rights." M
"It is well established under Utah law that
we will presume harm ... when a trial lourt
fails to inform a defendant of his
constitutional rights under rule 1!.
:e v.
Mora. 2003 UT Ann 117^ 22~~69 P.3d 838
(omission in original) *' *:* ^;on
md
quotations omitted). "We presume :rm
because, by not knowing which n-jh.-, a
defendan! is waiving, the defendant . - not
:-}..\-e .; fully informed dec-sum."
Id.
(citation and quotations omitted). ';f the
defendant is not fully informed of his rights
pr'uti ii'- pleading guilty, then the guilty plea
M ;".: voluntary. We cannot accept an
unoiumary guilty plea and still claiir* to
have done justice."
Id (citation
quotations omitted).
r

FN2. Because our decision that the
trial court did not strictly comply
with rule 11 b\ failing :-* Hf * in
Bluemel of certai'
- nuiu \ul
rights is di>positi\e. we need not
address her claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel nor Bluemel's
argument concerning the influence of
prescription
medicath --" vh
lllegedly prevented nor
from
:
]
. • • • : i t * " t '• < inderstanding her plea.
;. ^ii/iiili *''l^ "The procedures for
::;;cnng a guilty plea are set forth in rule 11
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure."
State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 6(Xf IK 983
P.2d 556; see also Utah R.Crim. P. 11.
"The plea-taking proceedings [in rule 11]
are intended to insure that a defendant who
pleads guilty knowingly and voluntarily
waives the protections the constitution
guarantees him or her prior to a trial
verdict." State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666. 671
(Utah Ct.Ami993). "A guilty plea must be
knowingly and voluntarily made in order to

j - *11 Under Utah law, the trial court;
: i i e burden •. •-f ensuring strict
pliance with rule 11. See State v.
i!& ^ons* 740 P.2d 1309, 1312-13 (Utah
.;
ippeal after remand on other
grounds, 779 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1989). "This
means 'that the trial court [must] personally
establish that the defendant's guilty plea is
truly knowing and voluntary and establish
on the record that the defendant knowingly
waived his or her constitutional rights.1 "
State v. Visser, 2000 UT 8 8 ^ 11, 22 P.3d
1242 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Ahevta, 852 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1993 V)."
Although the trial court has "a dui of 'sin i
compliance" with rule 11, strict compliance
"does not mandate a particular script or rote
recitation of the rights listed." ui_ In Ij'vAVl
the Utah Supreme Court, "reemphasizejd]
that the substantive goal of rule 11 is s >
ensure that defendants know of iheir ri*.*•.• ^
and thereby
understand
\vc
consequences of their decision * *
guilty.
rhat goal shoulJ
<oi
:
overshadowed or undermined by formal I si c
ritual." Id
' '
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**12 Rule 11(e) identifies specific rights
and factors of which the trial court must
inform the defendant. See Utah R.Crim. P.
11(e). These include, among other things,
that the plea is voluntary, the right to
presumption of innocence, the right to
counsel, the right against compulsory selfincrimination, the right to a speedy trial
before a jury, the right to confront and crossexamine witnesses, and that the defendant
waives these rights. See id. Rule 11(e) also
requires that the "defendant understand [ ]
the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the
prosecution would have the burden of
proving each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt, and that the plea is an
admission of all those elements." Id.
[9] [10] **13 In determining whether a
defendant is informed of his or her rights,
properly understands them, and voluntarily
waives them, the trial court must engage in a
plea colloquy with the defendant. See id.
Rule 11 provides two avenues whereby the
trial court may properly engage in a plea
colloquy. The trial court may (1) verbally
*186 question the defendant on the record
regarding each of the factors and rights
described in rule 11(e) or (2) receive a
written plea statement from the defendant
regarding each of the rights and factors. See
id. The plea statement is "used to promote
efficiency during a plea colloquy." Mora,
2003 UT App 117 at IT 19, 69 P.3d 838.
"However, [a plea statement] should be only
the starting point, not an end point, in the
pleading process."
Id. (citation and
quotations omitted). "It is critical ... that
strict [r]ule 11 compliance be demonstrated
on the record at the time the guilty ... plea is
entered. Therefore, if [a plea statement] is
used to aid [r]ule 11 compliance, it must be
addressed during the plea hearing." Id_ (first
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omission, and first and third alterations in
original) (citations and quotations omitted).
[11] **14 "The trial court must conduct an
inquiry to establish that the defendant
understands the [plea statement] and
voluntarily signed it." Id_ (citation and
quotations omitted); see also State v.
Mazuire. 830 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1991)
(holding a plea statement is "properly
incorporated in the record" when "the trial
judge ascertains in the plea colloquy that the
defendant has read, has understood, and
acknowledges all the information contained
therein"), appeal after remand, 924 P.2d 904
(Utah Ct.App.1996), rev'd on other grounds,
957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998). At that time,
"omissions or ambiguities in the [statement]
must be clarified during the plea hearing, as
must any uncertainties raised in the course
of the plea colloquy." State v. Smith 812
P.2d 470, 477 (Utah Ct.App.1991). Thus,
"the efficiency-promoting function of the
[plea statement] is thereby served, in that the
court need not repeat, verbatim, rule 11
inquiries that are clearly posed and answered
in the [statement], unless rule 11 by its terms
specifically requires such repetition." Id.
[12][13] **15
In this case, the plea
statement was not properly incorporated into
the record.
During the plea colloquy
concerning her statement, the trial court
asked Bluemel only if she had "any
questions about the statement." Bluemel
responded that she did not and was directed
by the trial court to sign the statement.
However, the trial court never asked
Bluemel if she actually read, understood,
and acknowledged her plea statement. See
Mazuire, 830 P.2d at 217. Nor did the trial
court make any other similar inquiry. We
conclude that this was a critical error. As a
result, "the [statement] was not properly
incorporated into the record, and we may not
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134P.3d 181
134 P.3d 181, 549 Utah Adv. Rep. 32,2006 UT App 141
(Cite as: 134 P.3d 181, 2006 UT App 141)
consider it when determining whether the
record establishes that the trial court strictly
complied with rule 11." State v. Mora, 2003
U T A p p l R f 20,69P.3d838.
[14] **16 In reviewing the plea colloquy
(exclusive of the plea statement) in this
matter, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of all of the rule life) factors and
rights.
See Utah R.Crim. P. life).
Specifically, the trial court failed to inform
Bluemel of her "right to the presumption of
innocence," that the State carried the burden
of proving her guilty "beyond a reasonable
doubt," that her "plea is an admission of all
those elements," and that she had the "right
to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses."
Utah R.Crim. P. 11 (e)(3),
(4)(A). As a result, the trial court erred by
not fully complying with rule 11 in this
matter.

Page 7

*187 **19 WE CONCUR: CAROLYN B.
McHUGH and GREGORY K. ORME.
Judges.
134 P.3d 181, 549 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 2006
UT App 141
END OF DOCUMENT

[15] **17
Additionally, because
noncompliance with rule 11 infringes on the
constitutional rights of the accused, see State
v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671 (Utah
Ct.App.1993),
we
conclude
that
noncompliance with rule 11 readily falls
within the interests-of-justice exception
under the PCRA, see Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-107(3). As a result, the trial court erred
by dismissing Bluemel's petition for postconviction relief.
CONCLUSION
**18 We conclude that the plea statement
was not properly incorporated into the
record and that the trial court did not
sufficiently conduct a rule 11 colloquy with
Bluemel.
As a result, BluemePs
circumstances qualified under the interestsof-justice exception to the PCRA and the
trial court erred by dismissing her petition.
We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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C
West's Utah Court Rules Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*l Part VIII. Provisional and Final Remedies and Special Proceedings
-•RULE 65C. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(a) Scope. This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions for post-conviction
relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-101 et seq., Post-Conviction
Remedies Act.
(b) Commencement and Venue, The proceeding shall be commenced by filing a
petition with the clerk of the district court in the county in which the judgment of
conviction was entered. The petition should be filed on forms provided by the
court. The court may order a change of venue on its own motion if the petition is
filed in the wrong county. The court may order a change of venue on motion of a
party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses.
(c) Contents of the Petition. The petition shall set forth all claims that the
petitioner has in relation to the legality of the conviction or sentence. Additional
claims relating to the legality of the conviction or sentence may not be raised in
subsequent proceedings except for good cause shown. The petition shall state:
(1) whether the petitioner is incarcerated and, if so, the place of incarceration;
(2) the name of the court in which the petitioner was convicted and sentenced and
the dates of proceedings in which the conviction was entered, together with the
court's case number for those proceedings, if known by the petitioner;
(3) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts that form the basis of the petitioner's
claim to relief;
(4) whether the judgment of conviction, the sentence, or the commitment for
violation of probation has been reviewed on appeal, and, if so, the number and title
of the appellate proceeding, the issues raised on appeal, and the results of the
appeal;
(5) whether the legality of the conviction or sentence has been adjudicated in any
prior post-conviction or other civil proceeding, and, if so, the case number and title
of those proceedings, the issues raised in the petition, and the results of the prior
proceeding; and
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(6) if the petitioner claims entitlement to relief due to newly discovered evidence,
the reasons why the evidence could not have been discovered in time for the claim
to be addressed in the trial, the appeal, or any previous post-conviction petition.
(d) Attachments to the Petition. If available to the petitioner, the petitioner shall
attach to the petition:
(1) affidavits, copies of records and other evidence in support of the allegations;
(2) a copy of or a citation to any opinion issued by an appellate court regarding the
direct appeal of the petitioner's case;
(3) a copy of the pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or
other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the conviction or sentence;
and
(4) a copy of all relevant orders and memoranda of the court.
(e) Memorandum of Authorities. The petitioner shall not set forth argument or
citations or discuss authorities in the petition, but these may be set out in a
separate memorandum, two copies of which shall be filed with the petition.
(f) Assignment. On the filing of the petition, the clerk shall promptly assign and
deliver it to the judge who sentenced the petitioner. If the judge who sentenced
the petitioner is not available, the clerk shall assign the case in the normal course.
(g)(1) Summary Dismissal of Claims. The assigned judge shall review the
petition, and, if it is apparent to the court that any claim has been adjudicated in a
prior proceeding, or if any claim in the petition appears frivolous on its face, the
court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the claim, stating either that the
claim has been adjudicated or that the claim is frivolous on its face. The order
shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate
with the entry of the order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite
findings of fact or conclusions of law.
(2) A petition is frivolous on its face when, based solely on the allegations
contained in the pleadings and attachments, it appears that:
(A) the facts alleged do not support a claim for relief as a matter of law;
(B) the claims have no arguable basis in fact; or
(C) the petition challenges the sentence only and the sentence has expired prior
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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to the filing of the petition.
(3) If a petition is not frivolous on its face but is deficient due to a pleading error
or failure to comply with the requirements of this rule, the court shall return a copy
of the petition with leave to amend within 20 days. The court may grant one
additional 20 day period to amend for good cause shown.
(4) The court shall not review for summary dismissal the initial post-conviction
petition in a case where the petitioner is sentenced to death.
(h) Service of Petitions. If, on review of the petition, the court concludes that all
or part of the petition should not be summarily dismissed, the court shall designate
the portions of the petition that are not dismissed and direct the clerk to serve a
copy of the petition, attachments and memorandum by mail upon the respondent.
If the petition is a challenge to a felony conviction or sentence, the respondent is
the state of Utah represented by the Attorney General. In all other cases, the
respondent is the governmental entity that prosecuted the petitioner.
(i) Answer or Other Response. Within 30 days (plus time allowed under these
rules for service by mail) after service of a copy of the petition upon the
respondent, or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the
respondent shall answer or otherwise respond to the portions of the petition that
have not been dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within 30 days (plus time allowed for
service by mail) after service of any motion to dismiss or for summary judgment,
the petitioner may respond by memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings
or amendments will be permitted unless ordered by the court.
(j) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall promptly set the
proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of the case. The court may also
order a prehearing conference, but the conference shall not be set so as to delay
unreasonably the hearing on the merits of the petition. At the prehearing
conference, the court may:
(1) consider the formation and simplification of issues;
(2) require the parties to identify witnesses and documents; and
(3) require the parties to establish the admissibility of evidence expected to be
presented at the evidentiary hearing.
(k) Presence of the Petitioner at Hearings. The petitioner shall be present at the
prehearing conference if the petitioner is not represented by counsel. The
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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prehearing conference may be conducted by means of telephone or video
conferencing. The petitioner shall be present before the court at hearings on
dispositive issues but need not otherwise be present in court during the
proceeding. The court may conduct any hearing at the correctional facility where
the petitioner is confined.
(1) Discovery; Records. Discovery under Rules 26 through 37 shall be allowed
by the court upon motion of a party and a determination that there is good cause to
believe that discovery is necessary to provide a party with evidence that is likely to
be admissible at an evidentiary hearing. The court may order either the petitioner
or the respondent to obtain any relevant transcript or court records.
(m) Orders; Stay.
(1) If the court vacates the original conviction or sentence, it shall enter findings of
fact and conclusions of law and an appropriate order. If the petitioner is serving a
sentence for a felony conviction, the order shall be stayed for 5 days. Within the
stay period, the respondent shall give written notice to the court and the petitioner
that the respondent will pursue a new trial, pursue a new sentence, appeal the
order, or take no action. Thereafter the stay of the order is governed by these rules
and by the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
(2) If the respondent fails to provide notice or gives notice that no action will be
taken, the stay shall expire and the court shall deliver forthwith to the custodian of
the petitioner the order to release the petitioner.
(3) If the respondent gives notice that the petitioner will be retried or resentenced,
the trial court may enter any supplementary orders as to arraignment, trial,
sentencing, custody, bail, discharge, or other matters that may be necessary and
proper.
(n) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, as allowed under
Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. If the petitioner is indigent, the
court may direct the costs to be paid by the governmental entity that prosecuted
the petitioner. If the petitioner is in the custody of the Department of Corrections,
Section 64-13-23 and Sections 78-7-36 through 78-7- 43 govern the manner and
procedure by which the trial court shall determine the amount, if any, to charge for
fees and costs.
(o) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the petition may be
appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of Utah
in accord with the statutes governing appeals to those courts.
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c
Aiue 78.. udicial Code
Part IV. Particular Proceedings •
r
M Chapter 35A. Post-Conviction Remedies Act (Rets & Annos)
*1 Part 1. General Provisions
•+§ ,;H-3MI- Ili', Statute of limitations for postconviction relief
V J A petitioner ib ciitnica to ^\ ^
after the cause of action has accr.u '

!

-^

.4l. ,, . liXcd vwilnn one year

(2) For put;- --cs of this section, the cause of action accrues on the latosif of flte
following dates: .'
-.; "iw .a^. .M; UM O'HIL: an app^; u~oiu i^e entry of the final judgment of
eonviclior '! v .o f^p:^' iv*;*t-.-»>(b) the entry of the decision of the appellate court wiik:
case, if an appeal is taken; '.••;•

?

< ^

. - -v.- 4- ua> icr iiling a petition lor writ of certiorari in the Utah Supreme
Court **'•l1i - I I n i f H ^f:M:-- ^iprcmc «"-uirt. i r no petition for writ of certiorari ^
Hied;
(d) the entn of IIK- denial of the petition for writ **\ ocithu.] or me vi^. * u :,i
decision on :he petition lor certiorari review, if a petition for writ of cert: - "ir".
tted: or
me uate on winch puiuuiici MICW or biiu^a have known, in the exeaise or
reasonable diligence, of evideni^rv r<w^ -»n ,. I.;,.L o ie pctitioi- is based.
(L-J

(3) If the court Finds \rt^ ')K interests of. justice require, a court :i::;\ .'vwwr
petitioner's failure to file within the time limitations.
(4) Sections 7 /-i9-o, /b-i„.-j.\ anu /a-u-4U du not extend the limitations period
established in this section.
Laws 1995, c. 82, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 19%. e. 2/o. j ,. cif. Aprn^A
19.96: Laws 2004, c. 139, § 2. eff. May 3, 2004.
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-21 I

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 5, 2001)

3
4

MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, can we call No. 4145, I
believe, Tammy Bluemel.

5
6

THE COURT: Tammy Bluemel.
arraignment, entry of plea.

7

Are we ready to proceed on that?

MR. LAWRENCE: We are, your Honor.

8

(inaudible) is Mr. Sturgill.

9

now.

10

The first matter is set for

The prosecutor

He's not in the courtroom right

He has signed the statement of defendant in support of a

guilty plea.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. LAWRENCE: Do you want to proceed on that or do you

13

want to

—

14

THE COURT: Is the State okay with that?

15

FEMALE PROSECUTOR; That's fine.

16

THE COURT: Okay.

17
18

If you'd tell me what that agreement

is.
MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, it's my understanding that

19 I the State has amended the counts, and my client will plead
20

guilty to three counts of rape and one count of supplying

21

alcohol to a minor.

22
23

THE COURT: Okay.

So do you want to just do Counts I,

II and III?

24

MR. LAWRENCE: That would be fine, your Honor.

25

FEMALE PROSECUTOR: And Count VIII.

THE COURT: And Count VIIi, * U
each of the three counts of rapp

light

\\rc\-

>

Ms. Bluemel,

^ p n v n p to.! t.u i »

^ach carry a maximum sentence of not iess than five years and
maybe for the rest of your life in prison, and a fine of up to
i.

I i s >\ mi Sdemeanor, carries a "maximum sentence o

;p to a year incarceration and a maximum fine of up to $2,500.
Before I r tn\ H en *p1 yi m

yh

* , , 11 I, , «

Constitutional Rights that you need to wai ve.
about in that stat.em.ent in advance of plea.
i> i " .: ;•• h< • ""

(-1 i a J 11

They are talked

Do you have any

I c statement?

MS. BLUEMEL; 1 don1 t, your Honor.
TT«? -" "."•

•

lers1 uil • , -1

have a right to a speedy trial, a right to a trial by jury, a
; ight to confront and cross examine the witnesses agair^*
\ 'iu have a right not to incriminate yourself; you don't have t
rake* uhe witness stand and testify.
f•

-j

• " * p r ' ° "i , i n y t h i r.'f.

In fact, y m donf t have t

i 1. •• ! >. i I

f pui

;s upon the

Slali-i to prove each and every element of the crimes that are
alleged.

Do you understand that?
II . liiiULMEL: I do, your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you waive those rights?

.'•••..

RS, RUJEMEL: f ho.
THE COURT: Do you have the factual basis for the •_'
charges?
FEMALE PROSECUTOR: Yes,, your Honor.

On or between

-41 I October 1999 and April of 1999 in Lehi, Utah, this individual
2 I had sexual intercourse with the 14-year-old victim on at least
3 | three separate occasions, and she also supplied alcohol to this
4 I individual.
5

THE COURT: Okay.

6

MS. BLUEMEL: Yes, your Honor.

7

MR. LAWRENCE: Just a clarification.

8

Are those facts true?

The alcohol was

provided on one occasion, your Honor.

9

THE COURT: Right, on —

oh, okay —

one occasion.

Do

10

you understand that if you wish to withdraw these pleas you

11

need to make a motion in writing to do that within 30 days of

12

sentencing.

13

motion, only if there were some good cause.

14

that?

The Court would not automatically grant that
Do you understand

15

MS. BLUEMEL: I do.

16

THE COURT: So if you do intend to plea, then let's

17

have you sign the statement. Once she signs that, Mr. Lawrence,

18

you may approach.

19

(Defendant signing statement)

20

THE COURT: I'll also add my signature to it.

21

Ms. Bluemel, to Count I, rape, a first-degree felony,

22

what is your plea?

23

MS. BLUEMEL: Guilty.

24

THE COURT: Count II, rape, a first-degree felony, what

25

is your plea?

MS.

R L U E M E L : Guilty.

• T H E C O U R T ; A n d Count I I I , rape, a first-degree felony,
what is your pi . •. !
MS.' B L U E M S L : Guilty. •
T H E COI JRT:

? i i 1, 1 .• 2- ::n .r .1 : ( I l l ,

supj L3 yi n g a„] ::oh,o,] 1 .• •

minor,, a Class A m i s d e m e a n o r , what' is your plea?
MS.

BLUEMEL; Guilty, your Honor.

THE L'MHI J
:y the C o u r t.

Pleas oi guilty are received, and accepted

I f i n d M s . B1 u erne 1 has k n o wi n. g 1 y and v o 1 u, n t a r i 1 y

t: e r e ::i h e r p,] e a s

a i I d p I i r s u a z i, t t i 11 I e a, g r e erne i I 1:, C o un t ,s I(

and V I I are dismissed.

••

'.-

P

The l a w required that sentence be imposed in not' less
. .EH i 2 n o r m o r e than 45 days

I am going to refer the m a t t e r

'-^ A d u l t Probation, and Parole for a presentence report and
I'T'immendu I n n,

, i.;ijl.t 'ncinii n i l I -! January

lu M a!., 4 'a.m.

-. " that's convenient with everyone 1, s calendar.
MR. L A W R E N C E : January 1 6 t h at what t i me,

'' " '•••-.
Ji ldge?

THE C O U R T : A t 9 - ™ ,
MR. LAWRENCE: T h a t w: 1 1 b e
T

v

'

•

fine,

.1 i \ , i 1 .1 :i i I &P, I I,

B l i lerrieJ ,

today,,

They'" 1 ] p r e p a r e a presentence report and, a recommendation.
Your attorney will receive a copy of that before the 1 6th, a „.i: id
review that w i t h y o u . Then you b e back here at 9 o'clock on
January 16 t h .
r.

A c t u a l l y that will be in courtroom 4 0 2 , right

'

I
-61

Now, on the other matter I'm wondering if we should —

2

MR. LAWRENCE: There is some confusion, Judge, if I can

3

interject.

4

THE COURT: Yes.

5

MR. LAWRENCE: What Mr. Sturgill and I had agreed to

6

last time, and I was not real clear when you stated it, we had

7

asked the Court to defer sanctions on the probation violation

8

until we get the sentencing report.

9
10

THE COURT: Let me continue the sanctions also until
January 16th at 9 a.m.

11

MR. LAWRENCE: That would be good.

12

THE COURT: Okay.

13

MR. LAWRENCE: Thank you, Judge.

14

THE COURT: You're welcome.

15

(Hearing concluded)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH

/

I, Beverly Lowe, a. Notary State of Utah,- do hereby certify:

ih i I ui

the

That this proceeding was transcribed under my
direction from the transmitter records made of these ..
meetings.
That Liils transcript is' full, true, correct, and
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the
same related which were audible through said recording.
I further certify that I am not interested in the ,.,•
i,,-!.j Lcorne thereof.
That certain parties were riot identified in the
record, and therefore, the name associated with the
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker.•
March
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My commission expires;
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Addendum D
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Fourth Judicial District Court
,f Utah r.nuntv. State of Utah
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bf ATEMENT OF DEFENDANT
IN SUPPORT OF GUILTY PLEA
ND CERTIFICATE OF COUNSEL

T_
iMiiinim;

Case JNO.

vs.
/A.

^^tl^OW^^

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COT
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.T/L; aci^i- - iedgc :*'d certify tha 11 has 'e been
advised of and that! understand th~ .vnu -nig facts and rights.
"fication (
1 H1,11j pleading guh-

; no contest; !u u^ Lnlow .ng crimes:

Crime & Statutory
Provision
/g-A /* £,„ _

Dcgrcc

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory
>
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I have received a copy of the (Amended) Information against me. I have read it, or
had it read to me, and I understand the nature and the elements of crime(s) to which I am
pleading guilty (or no contest).
The elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest) are:

f^\

/V & A- f

I understand that by pleading guilty I will be admitting that I committed the crimes
listed above. (Or, if I am pleading no contest, I am not contesting that I committed the
foregoing crimes). I stipulate and agree (or, if I am pleading no contest, I do not dispute or
contest) that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable. These facts provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty
(or no contest) pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest):
f?>f? ~?c<jrH^fz^/U
s *fA+s-?^

*>S -rt^rft **/

JTrA-7

& c T o J>S/C**0

p¥-

»r-r*sl

X^

uLTAf-'

^9 9*?

& ,o to

A-A*^LL—

P&HL^TArt+J-?

s 9 <?*<> >4.A3 . *

*t-*rsi v f ,

/ <? % 9

/^#Us

/ *? ? 9
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Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that I have the following rights
under the constitutions of Utah and of the United States. I also understand that if I plead
guilty (or no contest) I will give up all the following rights:
Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I
cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand

2

that I might later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay; for the
appointed lawyer's service to rue.
|^havenot)(have) vvai vud m v right to counsel TH have waived my right to counsel,
llTave done so knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily for the following reasons:

If I have waived my right to counsel, I certify that I have read this statement and that
I understand the nature and elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty
(or no contest)., I also understand my rights in this case and other oa.^s nr I rhe
consequences nr ^ v ™ »i]*v f^r ^ ^ contest) plea(s)
]fl ha\c noi waived my right to counsel, my attorney is i/f L-T<P^^ Z ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ y ^ c —
My attorney and I have fully discussed this statement, my rights, and the consequences of
my guilty (or no contest) pleat sV

(

,* iir\ I; *,*,, i know ..JI.IL i have a right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
. ^d) ji:r. .- i ih.it r ". Ke giving up that right by pleading guilty (or no contest). ...

( un; rotation and a c ^ - u a i * , '
i
. • >v that if I were to ha ve
a jurv trial, a) I would have the right to
i
.
^s.-es who testified against
me and c) my Attorney, or my sell il 1 wai\ed my right to an attorney, would have the
opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses who testified, against me. •
Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have a jury trial, I could call
witnesses if I chose to, and I would be able to obtain, subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of those witnesses, If I coi lid not afford to pay for the witnesses to appear, the
State would nnv : S ^ r ,v J
Righ i :
- \: * ^ J privilege against self-incrimination. I know that if I were to
' have a j • .ry ITMV «. w ould have the right to testify on my own. behalf I also know that if I
chose not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give evidence against myself.
I also know that if I chose not to testify, the jury would be told that they could not hold nay
refusal to testify' against me.
Presumption oi i^iiuceno; «*.« .
,
IMJO** d^i. ii i ^_ .^^ .
guilty (or no contest), I am presumed inno, .*
* into proves that I am guilty v f die
charged crime(s). If I choose to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would have the burden of proving

3

each element of the charge(s) beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the
verdict must be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
I understand that if I plead guilty (or no contest), I give up the presumption of
innocence and will be admitting that I committed the crime(s) stated above.
Appeal. I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I were convicted by a jury or
judge, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence. If I could not afford the
costs of an appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that I am giving up
my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty (or no contest).
I know and understand that by pleading guilty, I am waiving and giving up all
the statutory and constitutional rights as explained above.
Consequences of Entering a Guilty (or No Contest) Plea
Potential penalties. I know the maximum sentence that may be imposed for each
crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no contest). I know that by pleading guilty (or no
contest) to a crime that carries a mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving
a mandatory penalty for that crime. I know my sentence may include a prison term, fine, or
both.
I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent (85%) surcharge will be
imposed. I also know that I may be ordered to make restitution to any victim(s) of my
crimes, including any restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part of
a plea agreement.
Consecutive/concurrent prison terms. I know that if there is more than one crime
involved, the sentences may be imposed one after another (consecutively), or they may run
at the same time (concurrently). I know that I may be charged an additional fine for each
crime that I plead to. I also know that if I am on probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing
on another offense of which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty (or no
contest), my guilty (or no contest) plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being
imposed on me. If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when I was
imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to impose consecutive sentences
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentences would be
inappropriate.

4

Plea bargain. My guilty" (c. uu cwmcb v ^vn v i) (is'are) (is/are not) the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney All the promises, duties, and
provisions of the plea bargain, if anv5 are folly eoc\ii'\ : 'v. *h;s statement, including those
explained below—

"

/

"

'

/

""

" "

'
""""

* na, ,-.. *™ ~^t • - ' " know that any charge or sentencing concession or
-^ • -" .nendauux: oi probation or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the c h a r t s
•: .fencing, made or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney arc
binding on the judge. I also know that any opinions they express to me as to ^'h-^ •* . y
• • 1 •. ve the judge may do are not binding on the judge.
Defendant's Ceru^

;a, iiiess

I am entering ihis plea ofmyovvn free will and choi-.;- Nu lorce, uiieais,0L umawM
influence of any kind have been made to get me to plead guilty (or no r.^nte^tV \V promises
except those rnnt;» v , ^ -•-. tv^ statement have been made to me.
I have read ;h;s sutcmcjiiu or i ;^.w nau it rend • <* R- r\ my attorney, and I
understand its contents and adopt each statement in it as m\ own. I know that I am free to
change or delete anything contained in this statement. v ^ T • > no: wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct,
I .iin satisfied u i ill ihe advice and assistance of my attorney.. •
I am-?V years of age. I have attended school through the 12.-*- grade. 1 can read
and understand the English language. If I do not understand English, an interpreter has been
provided to me. I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or intoxicants
which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead guilty. I am not presently under
the influence of any drag, medication, or intoxicants \\h*ch ^i~\"«- —v Judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be mentally capable 01
understanding these proceedings and the consequences of my plea. I am free of any men?-!!
disease, defect, or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am *4or from knowingly, intelligently,, and voluntarily entering my plea.

5

I understand that if I want to withdraw my guilty (or no contest) plea(s), I must
file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days after I have been sentenced
and final judgment has been entered. I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I
show good cause. I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
Dated this ^

day of O z^c./^^ /? /£>/

3

2 <Dc& ./

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for. //v*
_, the defendant
/ff C-r',/ <ff, &* f3--C
above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her; I have
discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she folly understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief,
after an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of
the defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along with the other
representations and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing affidavit, are
accurate and true.

^TTOI
//Bar:

6

Y FOR DEFENDANT

Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
:...

yvx:.-i\ :. ; . ... ,ne attorney for the State of Utah in the case against
(&\C4 f rf) < I
defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of Defendant
and find that the factual basis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offense(s) is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage
a plea has been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained "in the
Statement and in the attached Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the
Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence w ouid support the conviction
of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are entered and that the acceptance
of the plea(s) would serve the public interest. ^
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

Bar No. " H ^ C ^ "

7

Order
Based on the facts set forth in the foregoing Statement and the certification of the
defendant and counsel, and based on any oral representations in court, the Court witnesses
the signatures and finds that defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) is/are freely,
knowingly, and voluntarily made.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant's guilty (or no contest) plea(s) to the
crime(s) set forth in the Statement be accepted and entered.
Dated this

.day of_

,2O0l

URT JUDGE

